{ "batch_id": "source-review-batch7-2026-11-01", "review_date": "2026-11-01", "protocol": "research/source-review-standard.md", "protocol_approval": "Owner-approved source-review standard for local audit work on 2026-11-01.", "branch": "audit/source-review-high-risk", "publication_state": "Local-only work in the existing source-audit worktree; no new work committed or pushed. No merge or release.", "reviewer_type": "Three AI-assisted claim-level audits with independent read-only post-edit reviews; no human expert review is claimed.", "batch_scope": "Three risk-ranked unaudited entries: Split Brains and the Unity of Consciousness; Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument; Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction (Grue).", "selection_method": "Ranked by empirical and interpretive risk in a contested neuroscience entry; attribution and primary-text access risk in a philosophical manipulation argument; and technical risk from conflating Goodman’s definition, projectibility, and modern proposed solutions. Each item records its specific risk_reason and audit_focus.", "counts": { "audited_entries_before_batch": 26, "entries_in_batch": 3, "audited_entries_after_batch": 29, "total_expansion_entries": 57, "expansion_entries_remaining_outside_claim_level_audits": 28, "final_status_counts": { "source_checked": 3, "partially_source_checked": 0, "needs_source_check": 0 } }, "status_summary": "All three entries are source_checked for their declared claim-traceability scopes after source-based edits and independent read-only post-edit review. The Four-Case item relies on appropriate full secondary passages because Pereboom’s 2001 Chapter 4 text was not accessible; that limitation is explicit, and an unverified public excerpt is not counted as evidence. The brain-bisection article now specifies that the Pinto comparison result was from Patient DDC only. None is expert_reviewed.", "entries": [ { "review_date": "2026-11-01", "reviewer_type": "AI-assisted claim-level source audit with independent read-only post-edit reviews; no human expert review is claimed.", "protocol": "research/source-review-standard.md", "id": "brain-bisection", "title": "Split Brains and the Unity of Consciousness", "article_path": "experiments/consciousness/brain-bisection.md", "status": "source_checked", "scope": "Claim-level traceability review of the complete article, matching dataset record, and expansion entry. Focus: classic split-brain methods and task-specific findings; limits of inference from everyday behavior; Nagel’s argument about unity and subject-count; current interpretive models; and Pinto et al.’s 2017 detection/localization and cross-hemifield comparison results. This status records source traceability, not settled neuroscience, the truth of a theory of consciousness, expert review, or exhaustive literature coverage.", "summary": "The classic primary reports support task- and response-dependent dissociations, with patient and testing limits preserved. Nagel’s full 1971 paper supports the philosophical question and his indeterminate-count conclusion, which the article distinguishes from an empirical result. Current SEP and the 2020 review represent the unity debate as open. Pinto et al. support the precise distinction now stated: both patients detected and localized stimuli across the field, while the separate cross-hemifield comparison was tested on Patient DDC alone and was not significantly above chance. The final independent reviewer confirmed that scope; the article and evidence record now specify the exact Pinto sections consulted. No expert review is claimed.", "sources": [ { "title": "Some Functional Effects of Sectioning the Cerebral Commissures in Man", "author": "Michael S. Gazzaniga, Joseph E. Bogen, and Roger W. Sperry", "publication": "Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 48(10) (1962): 1765–1769; DOI 10.1073/pnas.48.10.1765", "stable_url": "https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.48.10.1765", "source_type": "Primary peer-reviewed experimental report", "access_level": "Publisher-hosted full article text was accessed; relevant patient, test, results, and discussion passages were read.", "exact_locations_read": "Printed pp. 1765–1769, including the patient and surgical history, visual and visuomotor test results, and discussion of response-dependent performance and case limitations.", "limitations": "A small historical clinical case series cannot establish a single consciousness model or generalize identically to every patient. The report notes the case’s history and pre-existing brain injury; it is used for the specific test dissociations it reports." }, { "title": "Hemisphere Deconnection and Unity in Conscious Awareness", "author": "Roger W. Sperry", "publication": "American Psychologist 23(10) (1968): 723–733", "stable_url": "https://people.uncw.edu/puente/sperry/sperrypapers/60s/135-1968.pdf", "source_type": "Primary peer-reviewed research synthesis", "access_level": "Relevant passages in the full article were read, not only the abstract or metadata.", "exact_locations_read": "Printed pp. 723–727 on clinical context, lateralized tachistoscopic tests, separate verbal reports, and hand-selection responses despite inability to verbalize the stimulus.", "limitations": "A classic synthesis and selected test reports do not establish that all split-brain patients or all everyday activities show the same pattern." }, { "title": "Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness", "author": "Thomas Nagel", "publication": "Synthese 22 (1971): 396–413; DOI 10.1007/BF00413435", "stable_url": "https://www.mcgill.ca/science/files/science/channels/attach/brainbisection.pdf", "source_type": "Primary philosophical paper", "access_level": "Full paper text was accessed; relevant argument passages were read.", "exact_locations_read": "Printed pp. 401–402 on ordinary behavior and the experimental setting; pp. 406–409 on the tension between ordinary integration and experimental dissociation and the difficulty of assigning a determinate whole-number count of minds.", "limitations": "Nagel’s conclusion is a philosophical argument about concepts of mind and person, not a settled neuroscientific finding." }, { "title": "Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness — bibliographic record", "author": "Thomas Nagel", "publication": "Synthese 22 (1971): 396–413; publisher DOI record", "stable_url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413435", "source_type": "Publisher bibliographic record", "access_level": "Metadata only; the full argument was read in the McGill-hosted paper above.", "exact_locations_read": "DOI record for author, title, journal, volume, pages, and publication metadata.", "limitations": "This record establishes bibliographic details only, not Nagel’s argument." }, { "title": "The Unity of Consciousness", "author": "Farid Masrour, Andrew Brook, and Paul Raymont", "publication": "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; first published 27 March 2001; substantive revision 21 April 2025", "stable_url": "https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-unity/", "source_type": "Scholarly reference work / secondary analysis", "access_level": "Relevant sections of the current full entry were read; not every note or linked source is claimed as consulted.", "exact_locations_read": "§§3.1, 3.1.1, and 3.1.3 on the split-brain evidence, models of unified or divided streams, everyday-behavior evidence, and the limits of inference from behavior to subject-count.", "limitations": "A reference-work synthesis maps competing positions; it does not settle which model is correct or substitute for the primary experiments." }, { "title": "Split-Brain: What We Know Now and Why This is Important for Understanding Consciousness", "author": "Edward H. F. de Haan, Paul M. Corballis, Steven A. Hillyard, Carlo A. Marzi, Anil Seth, Victor A. F. Lamme, Lukas Volz, Mara Fabri, Elizabeth Schechter, Tim Bayne, Michael Corballis, and Yair Pinto", "publication": "Neuropsychological Review 30(2) (2020): 224–233; DOI 10.1007/s11065-020-09439-3", "stable_url": "https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7305066/", "source_type": "Open-access peer-reviewed review", "access_level": "Relevant full-text passages in the abstract, introduction, common-ground discussion, and conclusions were read.", "exact_locations_read": "Abstract and Conclusions on the insufficiency of evidence to decide unity versus split consciousness; discussion of everyday/social behavior as largely anecdotal, variable residual integration, and competing explanations.", "limitations": "The authors synthesize a contested field and explicitly describe insufficient evidence for a definitive yes/no answer; their review is not itself a new experiment." }, { "title": "Split brain: divided perception but undivided consciousness", "author": "Yair Pinto, David A. Neville, Marte Otten, Paul M. Corballis, Victor A. F. Lamme, Edward H. F. de Haan, Nicoletta Foschi, and Mara Fabri", "publication": "Brain 140(5) (2017): 1231–1237; DOI 10.1093/brain/aww358", "stable_url": "https://academic.oup.com/brain/article/140/5/1231/2951052", "source_type": "Primary peer-reviewed experimental report", "access_level": "Relevant full-text HTML sections were accessed and read; the subscription-only PDF was not required for the cited claims.", "exact_locations_read": "Patients and methods—Subjects/Procedure; Results, Experiments 1–2; Discussion. Experiment 1 reports detection and localization across the visual field for both DDC and DDV across response types. Experiment 2 reports cross-hemifield comparisons for Patient DDC only; mean performance was 55.4%, not significantly above chance (all stimulus categories P > 0.25).", "limitations": "Only two patients were studied; the cross-hemifield comparison result was from DDC, not both patients. The authors’ unified-consciousness interpretation is a contested interpretation, not a settled refutation of earlier dissociation findings." } ], "claim_evidence": [ { "material_claim": "Classic split-brain tests can reveal response- and task-dependent dissociations after commissurotomy, including differences between verbal naming and hand selection for lateralized stimuli.", "source_title": "Some Functional Effects of Sectioning the Cerebral Commissures in Man", "source_url": "https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.48.10.1765", "exact_location": "Printed pp. 1765–1769, especially visual and visuomotor test results and discussion; corroborated by Sperry (1968), pp. 723–727, on lateralized testing and separate verbal/hand responses.", "relationship": "supports_with_qualification", "finding": "The primary reports support the article’s description of controlled tests and response-dependent dissociations. The revised article specifies that results vary with patient, extent of disconnection, task, and response.", "limitation": "These tests do not establish that every patient has two subjects or that every everyday function is divided. The 1962 report concerns specific patients and procedures.", "required_edit": "Made: qualified the empirical summary by patient, surgery, task, and response; avoided inferring separate persons from the classic tests." }, { "material_claim": "Ordinary social behavior cannot by itself settle whether split-brain experience is unified or divided.", "source_title": "Split-Brain: What We Know Now and Why This is Important for Understanding Consciousness", "source_url": "https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7305066/", "exact_location": "Review abstract and Conclusions on insufficient evidence; SEP §§3.1 and 3.1.1 on the evidential limits of everyday behavior; Nagel, pp. 401–402 and 406–409, for the contrast between ordinary life and experimental dissociation.", "relationship": "supports_with_qualification", "finding": "The article does not describe everyday behavior as fully normal or as resolving the unity question; it presents ordinary integration and controlled dissociation as evidence that require interpretation.", "limitation": "The review reports that some functional integration may remain and that the mechanisms and subjective implications remain disputed.", "required_edit": "Made: removed a categorical implication that everyday behavior proves normal integration or a single subject." }, { "material_claim": "Nagel argues that the ordinary concepts of mind and person do not yield a determinate one-or-two answer for split-brain cases.", "source_title": "Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness", "source_url": "https://www.mcgill.ca/science/files/science/channels/attach/brainbisection.pdf", "exact_location": "Printed pp. 406–409, especially the concluding discussion of experimental evidence, ordinary integration, and the difficulty of assigning a whole-number count of minds; SEP discussion of Nagel in §3.1 provides context.", "relationship": "supports", "finding": "The article attributes this as Nagel’s philosophical conclusion, distinct from the underlying clinical results and from a settled neuroscience claim.", "limitation": "This establishes what Nagel argued, not that his conceptual conclusion is uniquely correct.", "required_edit": "Made: separated Nagel’s argument from empirical findings and framed it as his view." }, { "material_claim": "Current accounts include two-stream, single-stream, partial-stream, and hybrid models, and the model chosen does not by itself settle identity over time.", "source_title": "The Unity of Consciousness", "source_url": "https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-unity/", "exact_location": "SEP §§3.1, 3.1.1, and 3.1.3, on split-brain theories, differences between experimental and everyday contexts, and the structure of consciousness.", "relationship": "supports_with_qualification", "finding": "The article presents the taxonomy as competing proposals and does not identify a single model as consensus.", "limitation": "The classification is a concise summary; individual theories and hybrids have additional distinctions.", "required_edit": "Made: listed proposals as competing models and stated that they do not independently settle personal identity." }, { "material_claim": "In Pinto et al.’s 2017 study, both patients detected and localized stimuli across the visual field, while the cross-hemifield comparison result was tested on Patient DDC alone and was not significantly above chance.", "source_title": "Split brain: divided perception but undivided consciousness", "source_url": "https://academic.oup.com/brain/article/140/5/1231/2951052", "exact_location": "Patients and methods—Subjects/Procedure; Results, Experiment 1 (both patients’ detection/localization); Results, Experiment 2 (cross-hemifield comparison in DDC only, mean 55.4%, not significantly above chance); Discussion.", "relationship": "supports_with_qualification", "finding": "The article now distinguishes the two-patient detection/localization result from DDC’s separate comparison task. The paper’s claim that its broader results support undivided consciousness is identified as the authors’ contested interpretation.", "limitation": "Two patients cannot establish universal outcomes; the comparison result applies to DDC only and does not erase earlier task-specific dissociations.", "required_edit": "Made: specified Patient DDC for the comparison task, stated that performance was not significantly above chance, and added exact consulted sections to the source-attribution note." }, { "material_claim": "Philosophical extensions and thought prompts about reconnecting a divided brain or identity over time are not presented as clinical evidence.", "source_title": "The Unity of Consciousness", "source_url": "https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-unity/", "exact_location": "SEP §§3.1 and 3.1.3, which distinguish theories of unity and implications for the subject from experimental findings.", "relationship": "context_only", "finding": "The article labels hypothetical reconnection as a philosophical extension and separates identity questions from direct clinical findings.", "limitation": "The extension is an editorial teaching prompt rather than a claim established by the cited experiments.", "required_edit": "Made: labelled the reconnection scenario as a philosophical extension, not clinical evidence." } ], "edits_made": [ "Qualified classic empirical findings by patient, disconnection, task, and response; identified the 1962 primary study and cited Sperry’s 1968 synthesis.", "Distinguished Nagel’s 1971 philosophical conclusion from empirical neuroscience and from claims about personal identity over time.", "Presented current consciousness models as competing interpretations and described the broader evidence as unresolved.", "Corrected the Pinto result to distinguish both patients’ detection/localization from the cross-hemifield comparison tested on Patient DDC only.", "Recorded the exact Pinto Methods, Results, and Discussion sections consulted in the article and this ledger; aligned dataset references and review date." ], "unresolved": [ "Whether split-brain experience is unified, divided, or context-dependent remains disputed; the source review does not adjudicate that interpretation.", "The article is a concise educational account, not an exhaustive review of the split-brain literature or every clinical variation.", "No named human subject-matter expert reviewed the entry; it is not expert_reviewed." ], "dataset_alignment": "The brain-bisection data record’s Further Reading URLs match the article’s seven Further Reading URLs in the same order, including the PNAS publisher full text and Nagel DOI metadata record. Both article research-check date and data date_verified are 2026-11-01. No public source-review status field was added.", "further_reading_matches": "All seven article Further Reading URLs match the dataset record in the same order.", "ledger_path": "research/source-review-batch7-item-brain-bisection.json", "selection_rank": 1, "risk_reason": "The entry combines clinical neuroscience, controlled-task results, a philosophical argument, and a live consciousness debate; the main risk was conflating task-specific response dissociations with two subjects or misattributing a one-patient comparison result to both study participants.", "audit_focus": "Trace classic claims to primary clinical reports; separate Nagel’s conclusion from empirical results; check recent Pinto findings and current competing models; preserve the limits of everyday-behavior evidence and the access level of each source.", "independent_review": "An initial independent read-only review recommended partial status until the Pinto comparison result was explicitly limited to Patient DDC. The article was corrected; a targeted final reviewer confirmed both-patient detection/localization, DDC-only cross-hemifield comparison (55.4%, not significantly above chance), and the Discussion’s contested interpretation. The final reviewer requested exact passage locations; those are now included in the article note and claim ledger. Source_checked is justified for the declared claim-traceability scope. No expert review." }, { "review_date": "2026-11-01", "reviewer_type": "AI-assisted claim-level source audit with independent read-only post-edit reviews; no human expert review is claimed.", "protocol": "research/source-review-standard.md", "id": "four-case-argument", "title": "Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument", "article_path": "experiments/time-and-causality/four-case-argument.md", "status": "source_checked", "scope": "Claim-level traceability review of the complete article, matching dataset record, and expansion entry. Focus: the four-case progression and like-cases inference; the specified cases and compatibilist-friendly capacities; under-description and disagreement; hard- and soft-line replies; the target of basic-desert responsibility; related manipulation arguments; publication metadata; and accurate disclosure of primary-text access. This status follows the approved standard’s allowance for another appropriate source when relevant passages are read; it does not claim direct verification against Pereboom’s 2001 Chapter 4 or expert review.", "summary": "Full relevant passages in the archived SEP supplement, current SEP entry, Jeppsson’s peer-reviewed analysis, and Caruso’s précis support the article’s narrowed paraphrase of the cases, conditional inference, known disagreement, and basic-desert scope. The article no longer implies that the primary 2001 chapter was read: Google Books lists Chapter 4 but exposes selected image-only pages rather than its argument text; an online excerpt’s provenance remains unverified and is not treated as verified book text. A targeted independent post-edit reviewer passed the revised access disclosure. An earlier reviewer preferred a partial status because the primary chapter was inaccessible; this ledger adopts source_checked for the declared paraphrase/traceability scope because the appropriate full secondary passages were read and the access limit is explicit. No expert review is claimed.", "sources": [ { "title": "Compatibilism: State of the Art", "author": "Michael McKenna and D. Justin Coates", "publication": "Supplement to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry “Compatibilism,” Fall 2018 archive", "stable_url": "https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/compatibilism/supplement.html", "source_type": "Scholarly reference work / secondary analysis", "access_level": "Full relevant passages in the archived supplement were read.", "exact_locations_read": "Introduction, “The argument,” for the four-case sequence and inference; “The distinction” for the reply strategies and hard-/soft-line distinction.", "limitations": "The supplement is a secondary exposition and does not replace the unavailable text of Pereboom’s 2001 chapter; it presents the argument and replies rather than deciding whether it succeeds." }, { "title": "Arguments for Incompatibilism", "author": "Kadri Vihvelin", "publication": "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; first published 14 October 2003; substantive revision 22 August 2022", "stable_url": "https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/", "source_type": "Scholarly reference work / secondary analysis", "access_level": "Relevant full section text was read.", "exact_locations_read": "§3.2, “Manipulation and Design Arguments,” on under-description of the first three Plums, disagreement over verdicts, hard-line replies, and Mele’s related Ernie/Bert argument.", "limitations": "This reference-work discussion maps an active debate; it does not establish a consensus verdict about responsibility or the soundness of Pereboom’s argument." }, { "title": "The Agential Perspective: A Hard-Line Reply to the Four-Case Manipulation Argument", "author": "Sofia Jeppsson", "publication": "Philosophical Studies 177 (2020): 1935–1951; DOI 10.1007/s11098-019-01292-2; published online 3 April 2019", "stable_url": "https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1303683/FULLTEXT03", "source_type": "Peer-reviewed secondary philosophical analysis; published version", "access_level": "Full relevant article text was accessed; §1 and its case-by-case analysis were read.", "exact_locations_read": "§1, especially pp. 1935–1937, for the sequence, Cases 1–4, reasons-responsive stipulations, the Case 1 revision, and hard-/soft-line replies.", "limitations": "Jeppsson develops a hard-line reply and does not represent all compatibilists; the article’s argument is reported as one scholarly position." }, { "title": "Précis of Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life", "author": "Gregg D. Caruso", "publication": "Science, Religion and Culture 1(3) (2014): 178–201; published 29 November 2014", "stable_url": "https://researcherslinks.com/current-issues/Precis-of-Derk-Pereboom-Free-Will-Agency-and-Meaning-in-Life/9/13/51/html", "source_type": "Peer-reviewed secondary précis / symposium contribution", "access_level": "Full article text was accessed; relevant opening discussion and Chapter 6 discussion were read.", "exact_locations_read": "Opening discussion defining basic-desert praise/blame; sections summarizing Chapter 4’s four-case argument and Chapter 6’s forward-looking account of moral responsibility.", "limitations": "This is a précis of Pereboom’s 2014 book, not primary evidence for the wording of the 2001 chapter. It supports the distinction between basic-desert responsibility and other possible responses." }, { "title": "Living Without Free Will", "author": "Derk Pereboom", "publication": "Cambridge University Press, 2001; 231 pages; Chapter 4, “Problems for Compatibilism,” begins at p. 89", "stable_url": "https://books.google.com/books/about/Living_without_Free_Will.html?id=9sKZ1rAO2BwC", "source_type": "Primary-work bibliographic record and limited preview", "access_level": "Bibliographic record and selected image-only page previews were accessible; readable Chapter 4 argument text was not exposed.", "exact_locations_read": "Title and contents information; selected previews for the title/contents and later bibliography/index pages. Chapter 4 is listed at p. 89, but its argument text is not available in the preview.", "limitations": "This source establishes book metadata and the preview boundary only; it does not establish the cases or argument. The article’s primary-text access caveat remains explicit." }, { "title": "Unverified publicly hosted text reproducing the Four-Case passage", "author": "Attributed to Derk Pereboom in the consulted excerpt; authorship and edition identity not independently established", "publication": "Publicly hosted online text; publication container and identity with the 2001 Cambridge University Press edition unverified", "stable_url": "https://www.stafforini.com/docs/pereboom_-_living_without_free_will.pdf", "source_type": "Unverified excerpt; excluded from evidence supporting the article’s material claims", "access_level": "A passage reproducing case text was encountered, but the source’s container and edition were not verified; it is not treated as the verified primary text.", "exact_locations_read": "The Four-Case passage was consulted; no page or edition location is relied on because the copy’s provenance was not established.", "limitations": "No material claim in this ledger depends solely on this excerpt. The article explicitly says its publication container and 2001-edition identity could not be verified." } ], "claim_evidence": [ { "material_claim": "Pereboom’s four cases move from direct moment-to-moment manipulation, to birth programming, to upbringing, and then to an ordinary agent in a deterministic world; the inference appeals to treating relevantly like cases alike.", "source_title": "Compatibilism: State of the Art", "source_url": "https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/compatibilism/supplement.html", "exact_location": "Introduction, “The argument,” including the sequence from electronic intervention to programming/upbringing and Case 4; corroborated by Jeppsson §1, pp. 1935–1937.", "relationship": "supports_with_qualification", "finding": "The article describes the sequence and makes the inference conditional: a responsibility-relevant difference that blocks the transition to Case 4 would undermine the argument.", "limitation": "The cases’ comparability and the like-cases principle are contested; no claim is made that the argument is proven sound.", "required_edit": "Made: presented the transition as an argument with a conditional premise, not as an established equivalence." }, { "material_claim": "Case 1 uses radio-like technology to manipulate Plum’s decisions and actions moment by moment while stipulating compatibilist-friendly capacities, including reasons-responsive deliberation.", "source_title": "The Agential Perspective: A Hard-Line Reply to the Four-Case Manipulation Argument", "source_url": "https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1303683/FULLTEXT03", "exact_location": "Jeppsson §1, pp. 1935–1936; archived SEP supplement, “The argument,” describing direct electronic stimulation and moment-to-moment decisions/actions.", "relationship": "supports_with_qualification", "finding": "The article now says that technology manipulates decisions and actions moment by moment, rather than implying a distinct alteration of reasoning ability; it separately states that reasons-responsive deliberation is stipulated.", "limitation": "The article is a stylized thought experiment and compresses case details; no verbatim quotation from the inaccessible 2001 chapter is presented.", "required_edit": "Made: changed “manipulate Plum’s reasoning” to “manipulate Plum’s decisions and actions” and kept reasons-responsiveness as a separate stipulation." }, { "material_claim": "The move from the first three cases to ordinary determinism is disputed because the first three cases are under-described and different completions may change whether a responsibility-relevant difference exists.", "source_title": "Arguments for Incompatibilism", "source_url": "https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/", "exact_location": "§3.2, “Manipulation and Design Arguments,” passages on the first three Plum cases’ under-description, the relevance of how details are filled in, and objections to the inference.", "relationship": "supports", "finding": "The article accurately reports that case details and reader verdicts are contested and does not state that the transition is universally accepted.", "limitation": "The brief article does not catalog every response or each proposed detail that could matter.", "required_edit": "Made: added the current SEP qualification that the first three cases are under-described and verdicts can vary with specification." }, { "material_claim": "Hard-line replies deny that manipulation undermines responsibility or press for the same verdict in ordinary deterministic cases; soft-line replies accept the manipulation verdict but claim an ethically relevant difference from ordinary histories.", "source_title": "The Agential Perspective: A Hard-Line Reply to the Four-Case Manipulation Argument", "source_url": "https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1303683/FULLTEXT03", "exact_location": "Jeppsson §1, pp. 1936–1937, where the hard-line and soft-line reply labels and strategies are explained; archived SEP supplement, “The distinction,” for the premise-level strategy distinction.", "relationship": "supports_with_qualification", "finding": "The article describes both strategies as competing replies and explicitly says neither is settled.", "limitation": "The categories simplify a literature with multiple variants and do not imply that every author uses the labels identically.", "required_edit": "Made: attributed the taxonomy to Jeppsson and framed the responses as competing positions." }, { "material_claim": "The target is basic-desert responsibility; rejecting that kind of desert does not by itself decide whether protective, rehabilitative, or other forward-looking responses are justified.", "source_title": "Précis of Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life", "source_url": "https://researcherslinks.com/current-issues/Precis-of-Derk-Pereboom-Free-Will-Agency-and-Meaning-in-Life/9/13/51/html", "exact_location": "Opening paragraphs defining basic-desert praise/blame and the discussion summarizing Chapter 6’s forward-looking account of moral responsibility.", "relationship": "supports_with_qualification", "finding": "The article distinguishes basic-desert blame/praise from other possible responses and avoids claiming that skepticism entails abandoning all practical responses to wrongdoing.", "limitation": "Caruso summarizes Pereboom’s 2014 book; this is secondary context, not primary evidence for the 2001 chapter wording.", "required_edit": "Made: stated the basic-desert target and kept practical responses open." }, { "material_claim": "Mele’s Ernie/Bert case is related to, but not simply another name for, Pereboom’s four-case argument.", "source_title": "Arguments for Incompatibilism", "source_url": "https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/", "exact_location": "§3.2, “Manipulation and Design Arguments,” on Mele’s zygote argument and its structure relative to other manipulation arguments.", "relationship": "supports_with_qualification", "finding": "The article identifies a family resemblance but notes that causal histories and replies differ.", "limitation": "The entry gives only a brief comparison; the article does not claim to compare every manipulation argument.", "required_edit": "Made: labelled Mele’s argument as a related but distinct comparison." }, { "material_claim": "Google Books confirms the book’s bibliographic record and lists Chapter 4, but its selected-page image previews do not expose readable Chapter 4 argument text.", "source_title": "Living Without Free Will", "source_url": "https://books.google.com/books/about/Living_without_Free_Will.html?id=9sKZ1rAO2BwC", "exact_location": "Book record and contents list Chapter 4, “Problems for Compatibilism,” beginning at p. 89; selected image-only preview pages include title/contents and bibliography/index, not readable Chapter 4 text.", "relationship": "supports", "finding": "The article and data now say Chapter 4 is listed but its text is not exposed; an unsupported Internet Archive access statement was removed.", "limitation": "The record does not provide the primary chapter passage needed to verify its exact text or edition-specific detail.", "required_edit": "Made: corrected “title-page preview only” to describe selected pages accurately and removed the unverified Internet Archive claim." } ], "edits_made": [ "Narrowed the case descriptions and made the inference to Case 4 explicitly conditional on the absence of a responsibility-relevant difference.", "Changed Case 1 wording to match sources’ moment-to-moment manipulation of decisions and actions, while preserving the separate reasons-responsive stipulation.", "Added current SEP support for under-description, disagreement, and related Mele comparison; bounded hard-/soft-line claims to cited analyses.", "Clarified basic-desert scope and that protective or rehabilitative responses are not thereby ruled out.", "Corrected the Google Books selected-page disclosure in article and data; removed the unsupported Internet Archive access assertion; retained the excerpt-provenance caveat." ], "unresolved": [ "Readable text of Pereboom’s 2001 Chapter 4 was not available in the Google Books preview; the article relies on full relevant secondary passages and does not claim direct primary-text verification.", "A publicly hosted excerpt was consulted, but its publication container and identity with the 2001 edition remain unverified; it is excluded as evidence for the material claims.", "Whether the cases are sufficiently specified and whether manipulation undermines responsibility remain disputed; no philosophical verdict is claimed.", "No named human subject-matter expert reviewed the entry; it is not expert_reviewed." ], "dataset_alignment": "The four-case-argument data record uses the same five Further Reading URLs as the article in the same order, and its date_verified matches the article research-check date 2026-11-01. The Google Books support text now correctly describes selected pages and the unavailable Chapter 4 text. No public source-review status field was added.", "further_reading_matches": "All five article Further Reading URLs match the dataset record in the same order.", "ledger_path": "research/source-review-batch7-item-four-case-argument.json", "selection_rank": 2, "risk_reason": "The article explains a contested philosophical argument whose primary book chapter was not directly accessible; exact case details, attribution, and access disclosure therefore require careful separation of primary metadata from full secondary analyses.", "audit_focus": "Check the four-case sequence and replies against appropriate full scholarly sources; preserve disagreement and under-description; verify the basic-desert scope; correct the Google Books preview disclosure; record the primary-text and excerpt provenance limits.", "independent_review": "One independent reviewer supported the narrowed case content but conservatively preferred partially_source_checked because the 2001 chapter text was not accessible and the preview description was imprecise. After correction, a targeted independent reviewer passed the Google Books disclosure and recommended source_checked under the standard’s allowance for another appropriate source, while keeping the primary-text caveat explicit. The ledger adopts source_checked for the declared claim-traceability scope because relevant full passages in SEP and Jeppsson support the paraphrases; direct primary-text verification and excerpt provenance remain disclosed limits. No expert review." }, { "review_date": "2026-11-01", "reviewer_type": "AI-assisted claim-level source audit with independent read-only post-edit review; no human expert review is claimed.", "protocol": "research/source-review-standard.md", "id": "grue", "title": "Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction (Grue)", "article_path": "experiments/epistemology/grue.md", "status": "source_checked", "scope": "Claim-level traceability review of the complete article, matching dataset record, and expansion entry. Focus: Goodman’s definition of grue and its time cutoff; the conflicting future projections; the distinction between instance-confirmation and the projectibility problem; entrenchment; cited naturalness and Bayesian approaches; and the article’s own teaching analogies. This status records source traceability, not that Goodman’s argument succeeds or that one solution is accepted by consensus.", "summary": "Goodman’s full-text scan supports the grue definition, incompatible post-cutoff predictions, and the entrenchment discussion. The SEP Goodman and Problem of Induction entries contextualize the new riddle and positionality reply. Fitelson’s paper supports a qualified statement that Bayesian analyses depend on measures and assumptions, while the article explicitly marks its priors/model-class takeaway as an editorial inference. Scholz’s 2024 open-access paper supports identifying conceptual spaces as a particular similarity/naturalness proposal and attributing the normative critique to Scholz, not to consensus. The independent final review found no material issue in the declared scope.", "sources": [ { "title": "Fact, Fiction, and Forecast", "author": "Nelson Goodman", "publication": "4th edition (1983; first published 1955), Chapter III §4, pp. 73–81; Chapter IV §3, p. 94", "stable_url": "http://fitelson.org/probability/goodman_fact_fiction_and_forecast.pdf", "source_type": "Primary philosophical monograph", "access_level": "Full-text scan accessed; relevant definition, prediction, and entrenchment passages were read.", "exact_locations_read": "Chapter III §4, especially pp. 73–75 and continuing discussion through p. 81, for grue/bleen and projection; Chapter IV §3, p. 94, for entrenchment and predicate projection history.", "limitations": "The scan is the fourth edition; the article distinguishes the 1955 first publication from the 1983 edition consulted. Goodman’s proposal is presented as an account, not as a settled solution to the normative problem." }, { "title": "Nelson Goodman", "author": "Daniel Cohnitz and Marcus Rossberg", "publication": "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; first published 21 November 2014; substantive revision 8 February 2024", "stable_url": "https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goodman/", "source_type": "Scholarly reference work / secondary analysis", "access_level": "Relevant full-entry sections were read; not every bibliography item or linked note is claimed as consulted.", "exact_locations_read": "§§5.1–5.4, especially §5.3 on Goodman’s new riddle and grue/bleen, and §5.4 on entrenchment and the limits of Goodman’s account.", "limitations": "This entry provides a scholarly overview and interpretation; it is not a substitute for Goodman’s primary text." }, { "title": "The Problem of Induction", "author": "Leah Henderson", "publication": "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2024 edition; first published 21 March 2018; substantive revision 22 November 2022; current-version citation archived in Winter 2024", "stable_url": "https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2024/entries/induction-problem/", "source_type": "Scholarly reference work / secondary analysis", "access_level": "Relevant full-entry sections were read.", "exact_locations_read": "§4.2, “No Rules,” for Goodman’s new riddle and the projectibility problem; relevant Bayesian framework discussion for how background assumptions enter inductive reasoning.", "limitations": "The SEP entry treats induction broadly; it is used for context and not as primary evidence for Goodman’s exact definition." }, { "title": "Goodman’s “New Riddle”", "author": "Branden Fitelson", "publication": "Journal of Philosophical Logic 37(6) (2008): 613–643", "stable_url": "http://fitelson.org/grue.pdf", "source_type": "Peer-reviewed philosophical analysis; author-hosted manuscript of the published article", "access_level": "Full relevant manuscript text was read, including sections on confirmation measures, bridge assumptions, and total evidence.", "exact_locations_read": "§§3–4 and §6, especially manuscript pp. 15–16 on measure sensitivity and the conclusion on pp. 21ff.", "limitations": "The final publisher page did not load in the extraction attempt; publication venue/year were cross-checked against indexed bibliographic records. The article’s claims are qualified and do not depend on treating the manuscript as an unpublished draft." }, { "title": "Conceptual Spaces: A Solution to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction?", "author": "Sebastian Scholz", "publication": "Philosophia 52 (2024): 915–934; DOI 10.1007/s11406-024-00744-2", "stable_url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00744-2", "source_type": "Open-access peer-reviewed philosophical article", "access_level": "Full open-access article was accessed; abstract, introduction, and conclusion were read.", "exact_locations_read": "Abstract and §1 on Gärdenfors’s conceptual-spaces/similarity proposal; §5 conclusion, pp. 932–934, on the proposal’s current limits as a normative justification.", "limitations": "Scholz critiques one specific proposal and its current cognitive form; this is not treated as a survey verdict or consensus about every naturalness-based answer." } ], "claim_evidence": [ { "material_claim": "Goodman defines grue using a fixed future cutoff: an object examined before t is grue if green, while an object not examined before t is grue if blue; the observed emeralds therefore fit both green and grue descriptions before t.", "source_title": "Fact, Fiction, and Forecast", "source_url": "http://fitelson.org/probability/goodman_fact_fiction_and_forecast.pdf", "exact_location": "Chapter III §4, pp. 73–75, definition of grue and the emerald illustration; SEP Goodman §5.3 corroborates the new-riddle presentation.", "relationship": "supports", "finding": "The article now defines the cutoff explicitly and distinguishes examined-before-t from not-examined-before-t cases.", "limitation": "This is a simplified teaching formulation; the book’s fuller formulation is tied to a specified time and examination condition.", "required_edit": "Made: stated the cutoff and examination condition explicitly." }, { "material_claim": "Simple instance-confirmation can leave green and grue with the same observed support while implying incompatible predictions after t; this is Goodman’s projectibility problem, not merely the older Humean question of justifying induction in general.", "source_title": "Fact, Fiction, and Forecast", "source_url": "http://fitelson.org/probability/goodman_fact_fiction_and_forecast.pdf", "exact_location": "Chapter III §4, pp. 73–81; SEP Goodman §§5.1–5.3 and SEP Problem of Induction §4.2 for the distinction between the new riddle and induction’s broader justification problem.", "relationship": "supports_with_qualification", "finding": "The article explains the prediction conflict under a simple confirmation setup and identifies projectibility as the further problem.", "limitation": "The confirmation setup is an explanatory simplification, not a claim that every theory of confirmation assigns identical support in all formulations.", "required_edit": "Made: clarified the simple-confirmation assumption and separated Goodman’s riddle from the broader problem of induction." }, { "material_claim": "Goodman uses entrenchment—how successfully predicates have been projected in past practice—to explain why familiar predicates such as green are favored over grue, while leaving open whether this gives an ultimate normative justification.", "source_title": "Fact, Fiction, and Forecast", "source_url": "http://fitelson.org/probability/goodman_fact_fiction_and_forecast.pdf", "exact_location": "Chapter IV §3, printed p. 94; SEP Goodman §5.4 on entrenchment and the distinction between describing actual projection practice and ultimate justification.", "relationship": "supports_with_qualification", "finding": "The article attributes entrenchment to Goodman and describes its explanatory role without claiming it ends the normative debate.", "limitation": "Entrenchment’s adequacy as a justification remains a philosophical question; the article does not claim otherwise.", "required_edit": "Made: narrowed the description of entrenchment and its explanatory scope." }, { "material_claim": "Conceptual spaces and similarity provide one contemporary naturalness-based approach; Scholz argues that the proposal in its current cognitive form does not supply the needed normative justification.", "source_title": "Conceptual Spaces: A Solution to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction?", "source_url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00744-2", "exact_location": "Abstract, §1, and §5 conclusion, pp. 932–934; SEP Goodman §5.3 provides background on competing responses.", "relationship": "supports_with_qualification", "finding": "The article identifies a specific proposal and attributes its critique to Scholz rather than presenting it as a settled literature-wide verdict.", "limitation": "The claim concerns Scholz’s assessment of a particular version of Gärdenfors’s account; it does not rule out all naturalness or similarity theories.", "required_edit": "Made: narrowed the naturalness discussion to the proposal Scholz reviews and stated the critique as his conclusion." }, { "material_claim": "The positionality objection notes that grue/bleen appear dependent on green/blue in a language where green/blue are basic; Goodman’s symmetry response reverses that dependence in a grue/bleen-basic language.", "source_title": "Nelson Goodman", "source_url": "https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goodman/", "exact_location": "SEP §5.3, discussion of positionality and Goodman’s symmetry response.", "relationship": "supports_with_qualification", "finding": "The article presents positionality as an objection and Goodman’s response, then identifies language-invariant naturalness as the remaining issue rather than declaring a winner.", "limitation": "The short entry does not exhaust every response to Goodman’s symmetry argument.", "required_edit": "Made: attributed the positionality objection and Goodman’s reply, and limited the article’s conclusion to that exchange." }, { "material_claim": "Bayesian accounts can assign different comparative confirmation results depending on confirmation measures, prior/model classes, bridge assumptions, and background evidence; the article’s model-class takeaway is an editorial inference rather than a direct result attributed to Fitelson.", "source_title": "Goodman’s “New Riddle”", "source_url": "http://fitelson.org/grue.pdf", "exact_location": "Fitelson §§3–4 and §6; manuscript pp. 15–16 on measure sensitivity and later discussion/conclusion pp. 21ff on assumptions and total evidence.", "relationship": "supports_with_qualification", "finding": "Fitelson’s analysis supports the qualified sensitivity claim. The article labels its broader priors/model-class moral as its own editorial inference.", "limitation": "The article is not presented as a survey of every Bayesian analysis; the manuscript text, rather than the publisher-hosted version, was consulted.", "required_edit": "Made: retained the qualification and marked the model-class takeaway as editorial inference." }, { "material_claim": "The machine-learning comparison and place-dependent predicates are teaching analogies/extensions, not historical claims about Goodman’s own examples or a sourced resolution of the riddle.", "source_title": "Fact, Fiction, and Forecast", "source_url": "http://fitelson.org/probability/goodman_fact_fiction_and_forecast.pdf", "exact_location": "The article’s explicit framing in §§5 and 7 was compared with Goodman, Chapter III §4; the analogy and place-dependent extension do not appear as claims about Goodman in the consulted primary passage.", "relationship": "context_only", "finding": "The article labels these as an analogy and an extension rather than as Goodman’s own historical variants.", "limitation": "These are editorial illustrations and are not independently evaluated here as technical AI claims.", "required_edit": "Made: explicitly labelled both as teaching analogies/extensions." } ], "edits_made": [ "Made the future cutoff and examination condition in the grue definition explicit.", "Separated Goodman’s projectibility problem from the broader justification problem for induction and identified the simplifying confirmation assumption.", "Narrowed the entrenchment account and labeled the machine-learning and place-dependent constructions as editorial extensions.", "Limited the naturalness discussion to Scholz’s specific proposal and labeled the Bayesian priors/model-class takeaway as an editorial inference.", "Aligned the article’s five Further Reading URLs with the dataset record and matched the verification date." ], "unresolved": [ "Whether any response fully resolves Goodman’s new riddle remains an active philosophical issue; the article summarizes a limited selection rather than a comprehensive survey.", "The publisher endpoint for Fitelson’s final article was not extractable; the manuscript text and indexed bibliographic metadata were consulted instead.", "The place-dependent and machine-learning examples are teaching extensions, not claims established by the cited sources." ], "dataset_alignment": "The grue data record’s five Further Reading URLs match the article’s five URLs in the same order, and date_verified matches the article research-check date 2026-11-01. No public source-review status field was added.", "further_reading_matches": "All five article Further Reading URLs match the dataset record in the same order.", "ledger_path": "research/source-review-batch7-item-grue.json", "selection_rank": 3, "risk_reason": "The entry combines a technical definition, competing confirmation predictions, a subtle distinction between descriptive and normative accounts, and modern Bayesian/naturalness responses; the main risks were oversimplifying the cutoff or overstating a single contemporary proposal as a consensus solution.", "audit_focus": "Check Goodman’s primary definition and entrenchment passages, distinguish Goodman’s problem from Hume’s broader question, verify each modern response against its source, and label unsourced extensions as editorial framing.", "independent_review": "Final independent read-only review recommended source_checked for the declared material-claim scope. It confirmed the definition, entrenchment, positionality, specific naturalness critique, Bayesian qualifications, article/data URL order, and dates. The review found no material correction outstanding. No expert review." } ] }