Cooperation, Choice, and Collective Decisions
This path covers the problems that arise when individual choices combine: when cooperation is risky, when majorities cycle, and when tiny probabilities dominate a calculation. The models are simplified, so ask what real institutions add.
Learning objectives
- Distinguish a cooperation problem driven by temptation from one driven by risk.
- Explain why aggregating preferences is harder than it looks.
- Evaluate when expected-value reasoning fails or is exploited.
Recommended sequence
- The Prisoner’s Dilemma — Begin with the model of mutual defection.
- The Stag Hunt — Contrast it with a case where trust is the problem.
- The Tragedy of the Commons — Ask how shared resources are overused.
- The Condorcet Paradox — See how majority preferences can cycle.
- Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem — Learn why no ranking rule satisfies every fairness condition.
- Sen’s Paradox of the Paretian Liberal — Ask whether a right to liberty conflicts with efficiency.
- The Veil of Ignorance and Original Position — Consider choosing rules without knowing your place.
- Pascal’s Wager — Turn to decisions with infinite stakes.
- Pascal’s Mugging — Ask how to resist manipulation by tiny probabilities.
Read each article’s scenario first, write an initial answer, and then read the interpretations and sources. Spend as long as useful; there is no required schedule.
Reflection questions
- Which institutions turn a stag hunt into a stable cooperative outcome?
- Is a cycle in majority preferences a problem for the group or for the procedure?
Final synthesis activity
Design a rule for a small club to choose a meeting time or a budget. Say which of the problems in this path it avoids, which it faces, and which condition you chose to give up. Label the rule as your own proposal.
Return to the collection