Category: ethics
Type: thought experiment
Associated thinker(s): No originator is identified in the cited source
Original publication or approximate period: The cited source does not establish the bomber pair’s origin or first publication; the doctrine of double effect has medieval roots
Difficulty: Intermediate
Themes: intention, double effect, war
Related experiments: Trolley Problem; Transplant Problem
In Alison McIntyre’s example, the terror bomber aims to kill civilians to weaken enemy resolve, while the tactical bomber aims at a military target and foresees civilian deaths. For comparison, this article stipulates that both plans would certainly cause the same number of civilian deaths. This is a philosophical hypothetical, not a report about an actual air campaign.
Does it matter morally whether harm is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side effect when both plans are stipulated to cause the same number of civilian deaths?
McIntyre describes the contrast as matching a widely affirmed judgment in the stipulated case. That reports a judgment discussed in the entry; it does not establish universal agreement or by itself settle whether an attack is permissible. The doctrine of double effect is one proposed account, and its formulations include conditions beyond the intention/side-effect distinction.
The example also raises questions about wartime civilian harm. The cited SEP entry discusses humanitarian-law precautions and medical ethics, but it does not establish a general legal test for every conflict or policing situation.
McIntyre discusses several distinct disagreements. Some critics question whether intention has independent moral significance; others dispute how the doctrine applies to particular cases or whether it explains the judgments it is meant to capture. One account, associated with Quinn, distinguishes direct from indirect agency. The entry also discusses views on which intentions can matter to deliberation or moral assessment even when their effect on permissibility is contested. These are selected positions, not a settled or exhaustive taxonomy.
Foreseeing harm does not by itself make an act permissible. McIntyre’s discussion treats proportionality as insufficient on its own and also emphasizes minimizing harm and considering feasible precautions. The example is a philosophical analysis, not a legal verdict that a particular bombing is lawful or justified.
Discussions of the trolley problem use the doctrine to compare redirecting a threat with using a person as a means. Varying the number of civilians or the likelihood of success changes the hypothetical; these are teaching prompts, not claims about the cited bomber example.
Relevant sections of McIntyre’s complete SEP entry were read for the doctrine’s formulations, the bomber comparison, and its qualifications and debates. That entry does not identify the bomber pair’s first publication or originator; this review does not infer that none exists. The equal-casualty stipulation is part of the cited example as described by McIntyre. This article does not claim that a philosophical example determines the legal status of any actual attack or that the debate is settled.
Research check: 2026-11-01. Claim-level evidence, access limits, and unresolved issues are recorded in the source-review ledger.